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COMMENTS ON MARY BECKER
RICHARD DELGADO*

Professor Becker was kind enough to invite me to address
what minority scholars are doing and writing with respect to hate
speech and the First Amendment. I am happy to take her up on
her offer. Many of the themes and currents she mentioned in
feminist literature have parallels in the work of scholars of color.
Just as feminist scholars have been doing, we have been
evaluating the range of stories and narratives that everyone takes
for granted, that form what we might call the cultural canon,
stories such as: without discrimination, no intent; affirmative action displaces and is unfair to innocent whites; free speech is a
great boon for dissident groups; and so on.' These and many
similar stories encode a kind of cultural preference or point of
view that renders reform slow and makes it difficult for one to
get one's message heard. 2 A new form of scholarship, called
narrative jurisprudence, examines these comforting stories and
myths, showing how they work together to create a system of
White-over-Black (and White-over-Brown-and-Yellow) hegemony.3
Some of us use "counterstories" to challenge, displace, and dis4
comfit the dominant accounts or tales.
A second focus looks at the role of free speech and communication in enforcing, not general, but highly personalized subordination. An early article, Words that Wound,' considers whether
racial and other types of insults ought to be redressable in tort.
Later work by Mar Matsuda, 6 Charles Lawrence, 7 and myself
addresses whether hate speech ought to be regulated on university
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELusrvE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1979); Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionistsand Others:
A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989).
2. See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
3. See Delgado, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 2416-35.
5. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.. L. REV. 133 (1982).
6. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
7. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431.
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campuses and other places. Much of this writing urges that we
give greater attention to the issue of harm in free speech jurisprudence, and that First Amendment doctrine in this area must come
to reflect equality concerns as 'much as those that are libertybased.8
Recent work by Jean Stefancic and myself focuses more specifically on the marketplace of ideas rationale underlying much
First Amendment thought. 9 In a recent piece in Cornell Law
Review, we show that the free market of ideas may provide an
effective means of correcting error and reaching consensuses in
connection with disputes that are small and narrowly bounded.
For example, does a heavy object fall faster than a light object in
a vacuum; should we operate public schools according to a voucher
system; and so on.' 0 However, free expression is much less effective
in remedying systemic social ills, such as racism or sexism. Speech
is paradigm-dependent; it relies on a common set of conventions,
meanings, interpretations, and preconceptions." But racism is part
of that paradigm, part of the group of received wisdoms and
stories by which we understand and construct reality. One cannot
speak up against the racism of one's age, one's time, without
seeming political, incoherent, or strange. We reviewed two centuries
of ethnic depiction of four main groups of color in the U.S.Blacks, Mexicans, Indians, and Asians-to show that the dominant
images and stereotypes of these persons at any time in history were
demeaning-but not recognized as such at the time." That recognition only comes much later, as consciousness changes and society
adopts a new paradigm. The vaunted marketplace of ideas, then,
cannot correct racial images and stereotypes because they seem to
everyone to be more or less true; the critics seem to be calling for
censorship, seem to lack a sense of humor. All literary, or theatrical
works, we tell ourselves, rely on stock characters. What is so
wrong with the ones we use? 3
We coined the term "empathic fallacy"'' 4 to designate the
error of believing that we can endlessly and perfectly reform
ourselves and each other by linguistic means-by reading or writing
8. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2356-61.
9. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. RaV.
1258 (1992).
10. Id. at 1259.
11. Id. at 1260-61, 1277-79.
12. Id. at 1262-79.
13. Id. at 1278.
14. Id. at 1261, 1281 (coining term "empathic fallacy").
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ennobling texts, arguing, writing briefs, delivering lectures and
sermons, and so on. History shows speech has much less efficacy
than we like to think. Linguistic theory supplies the reason why:
we hear, receive, and interpret new stories in terms of the old, the
ones we have already internalized and now use to judge the new."
Ones that deviate too radically from the ones we have heard before,
we quickly pronounce wrong or extreme.
Charles Lawrence 6 and others look at the history of U.S. race
relations in order to assess the claim, made by the First Amendment's defenders, that the First Amendment has been of great
value to minorities and reformers. These scholars point out that,
contrary to the usual view, free speech has not proven of great
benefit to the cause of civil rights. In the 1960s for example,
protesters picketed, were arrested, and convicted. They sat in, were
arrested, and convicted. They leafletted, were arrested, and convicted. They tried to parade, were arrested, and convicted. Many
years later, after the expenditure of thousands of dollars and much
gallant lawyering, the conviction would sometimes be overturned.
But generally, to make advances, we have had to act in DEFIANCE
of the First Amendment as it was then understood and interpreted. 17 The First Amendment has not been of great value to
social reformers.
A number of us have extended this analysis to the present,
examining the landscape of First Amendment doctrines, tests, and
so-called exceptions.' 8 Our system of free speech is not really a
system at all, but rather a patchwork of tests, standards, and
exceptions. Probably more speech is subject to some form of
punishment or regulation than speech which is completely free,
that is, beyond regulation. Furthermore, these exceptions have a
certain thematic unity.19 For example, if you say disrespectful
words to a judge or other authority figure, you will quickly discover
that your words were not free, after all. 20 The same is true of
words that disparage a wealthy and well-regarded individual. 2' This
person can sue you for damages; your words really were not free.
15. Id. at 1277-82.
16. Lawrence, supra note 7.
17. Id. at 466.
18. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rv. 343, 375-83 (1991).
19. Namely, they reflect cultural power. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An
Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 813 (1992).
20. Images, supra note 9, at 1286.
21. Id. at 1285.
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And the same is true for words that violate a copyright, words
that plagiarize, 22 words of conspiracy, 23 false advertising,2 words
of threat, 25 and so on for at least twenty exceptions, all of which
track and protect the interests of the powerful. Of course, when
someone proposes a narrow exception, such as a campus hate
speech code, aimed at protecting the interests of some of the most
vulnerable members of society-young Black undergraduates at
White institutions-free speech absolutists cry foul: our system of
free speech must be a seamless web. 26 Showing that the web is far
from seamless, and what the pattern of those seams is, has been
one of the projects of recent outsider scholarship.
Another focus examines the psychology of judging. 27 Applying
some of the insights associated with empathic-fallacy literature,
some scholars of color have been looking at the way judges rarely
seem able to avoid what later appears to be serious moral error.
Examining cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson,28 Dred Scott v. Sandford,29 and Korematsu v. United States,30 we identify ways in which
culture permeates and determines judicial decisionmaking, often in
ways that a later time sees as incomprehensible.
As you can see, many of the interests and focuses of minority
scholars mirror ones that Professor Becker identifies in connection
with feminist jurisprudence and its treatment of speech and depiction issues. Running across both areas of scholarship is the notion
that the First Amendment, as currently constituted and interpreted,
is a much more valuable tool for the majority than the minority.
In fact, disempowered groups often find that free speech is used
to deepen, not relieve, their predicament. That which many are
accustomed to holding dear, others regard warily, not as a friend
but as a potential enemy. A poor situation, certainly-and one at
odds with the dominant conception of the First Amendment as a
friend and ally of the dispossessed.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
nities, 82
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.at 1286.
Delgado, supra note 18, at 377.
Id.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 9, at 1286.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech: Loving CommuCAL. L. Rv. (forthcoming 1994).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).

